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ABSTRACT
Governments around the world have enacted or are currently  considering fundamental
structural reforms of their Social Security pension programs.   The key feature in these reforms is
a shift from a pure pay-as-you-go tax-financed system, in which taxes on current workers are
primarily distributed to current retirees,  to a mixed system that combines pay-as-you-go benefits
with investment-based personal retirement accounts. 
This paper discusses how such a  mixed system could work in practice and how the transition
to such a change could be achieved.  It then analyzes  the economic gains that would result from
shifting to a mixed system.  I turn next to the three problems that critics raise about any investment-
based plan: administrative costs,   risk, and income distribution.  Finally, I comment on some of the
ad hoc proposals for dealing  with the financial problem of Social Security without shifting to an
investment-based system.
Martin Feldstein
National Bureau of Economic Research
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
feldstein@nber.org*Professor of Economics, Harvard University, and President of the National Bureau of
Economic Research, both in Cambridge, Massachusetts.  (Mfeldstein@Harvard.edu) 
My views on this subject have benefitted from collaborative research with Jeffrey
Liebman, Elena Ranguelova and Andrew Samwick; references to some of our joint work appear
in the references to this paper. I have also learned a great deal from the wide range of research
developed in recent NBER projects on Social Security presented in Campbell and Feldstein
(2001), Feldstein (1998),  Feldstein and Liebman (2002c) , Feldstein and Siebert (2002) and
Shoven (2000). I am grateful for comments on an earlier draft of this paper by Kathleen
Feldstein, Stephen Goss, Larry Kotlikoff, Jeffrey Liebman, Andrew Samwick and the editors of
this Journal.
1For a more general discussion of the reform of social insurance programs, including
unemployment insurance and health insurance, see my 2005 presidential address to the American
Economic Association (Feldstein, 2005a).
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Structural Reform of Social Security
Martin Feldstein
*
Governments around the world have enacted or are currently  considering fundamental
structural reforms of their Social Security pension programs.
1  The key feature in these reforms is
a shift from a pure pay-as-you-go tax-financed system, in which taxes on current workers are
primarily distributed to current retirees,  to a mixed system that combines pay-as-you-go benefits
with investment-based personal retirement accounts. Countries as different as Australia, Chile,
China, Britain and Sweden have already adopted mixed systems of this type (Feldstein, 1998;
Feldstein and Siebert, 2002). In the United States, President Clinton almost proposed such a plan
(Elmendorf, Liebman and Wilcox, 2001) and President Bush has made it a major priority for his
second term.
This paper will first explain how Social Security works now, how a mixed system could
work in practice, and how the transition to such a change could be achieved.  I will then discuss-3-
the economic gains that would result from shifting to a mixed system.  I then turn to the three
problems that critics raise about any investment-based plan: administrative costs,   risk, and
income distribution.  Finally, I comment on some of the ad hoc proposals for dealing  with the
financial problem of Social Security without shifting to an investment-based system.
Social Security Today
The Social Security program in the United States now provides retirement benefits equal
to about 40 percent of the final year earnings for someone who has had median earnings all his life
and who retires at the normal retirement age ( now gradually increasing from 65 to 67). The
replacement rate is higher than 40 percent for those with lower lifetime earnings and lower than
40 percent for those with higher lifetime earnings, although the extent of redistribution is less than
generally believed. (I will return to this subject below.)  After benefits begin, they are indexed to
the consumer price index. An additional  50 percent of the retiree’s benefit is payable to a married
couple if the resulting total exceeds what they would receive based on their two separate earnings
records. A widow receives the greater of her own potential benefit and the benefit to which her
husband would have been entitled; the same rule applies to widowers.  There is a separate
program for the disabled that I will not discuss.
These retiree and survivor benefits are financed by a payroll tax, currently 10.6  percent of
wages up to $87,900 (in 2004) and divided equally between employees and employers. The
maximum taxable earnings rises annually in line with average wages.  This payroll  tax revenue is
supplemented by a transfer of the income tax revenue that results from taxing a portion of the
benefits received by higher income individuals, bringing the current program receipts to 10.9
percent of taxable payroll. In addition to the 10.6 percent payroll tax for the Old Age and Survivor-4-
Insurance (OASI) program, there is a 1.8 percent payroll tax for disability and a 2.9 percent
payroll tax (with no limit on the taxable wage) for Medicare, bringing the total payroll tax rate to
15.3 percent. 
Social Security is essentially a pay-as-you-go program in which current tax revenue is used
to pay current benefits.  Unlike a private pension, private stocks and bonds are not accumulated to
pay future benefits. The revenue received by the Social Security program is technically credited to
the Social Security trust fund, but any of the receipts that are not used to pay current benefits are
loaned to the government to finance other government activities. Although the trust fund is
therefore nominally invested in government bonds and credited with interest at a government
bond interest rate, it is essentially just an accounting mechanism for keeping track of past Social
Security surpluses.  Since the current inflow to the trust fund exceeds  the actual cost of current
benefits (expected to equal to 9.1 percent of taxable payroll in 2005) , the trust fund balance is
now  increasing. 
When annual benefits exceed the inflow to the program (excluding the interest received
from the Treasury) in about 2018,  the government will have to sell bonds to the public to finance
benefits.  That those bonds are technically associated with the trust fund does not change the fact
that they will be government borrowing that increases the budget deficit and crowds out private
investment.  Although the political focus is on the projections that the trust fund balance will
reach zero in 2044, the more important date is 2018  when the government must begin borrowing
to pay benefits.
Since Social Security began in 1937, it has paid benefits to each generation of retirees that
have exceeded the taxes that that generation paid while working.  The implicit rate of return on-5-
Social Security contributions is not determined by return on the trust fund investment but reflects
the growth of the payroll tax base from one generation to the next.  Paul Samuelson’s (1958)
famous overlapping generations paper explained that a pure pay-as-you-go Social Security
program with a constant tax rate can pay an implicit rate of return equal to the growth rate of the
tax base,  since each generation of retirees is supported by a larger tax base than the one on which
it paid tax when it was working. 
In practice, the implicit rate of return that retirees have received on their Social Security
taxes has been much greater than the growth of the tax base because the tax rate was also rising
rapidly. The payroll tax was gradually raised from the initial 2 percent in 1937 to the current 10.6
percent, creating a series of windfalls as subsequent generations of retirees received benefits
financed by a higher tax rate than the one that they had paid when they were working.  The
resulting high rates of return contributed to the political support for the program and for its
increasing tax rate. 
The Politics of Reform 
The projected increases in the future number of retirees per worker mean that the high
implicit rates of return have come to an end.  The Social Security Administration (SSA) estimates
that with the 10.6 percent tax rate and the benefits projected in current law, an individual joining
the labor force today would receive an implicit real rate of return of only about 2.5 percent (Social
Security Administration, Office of the Actuary, 2001). Even that low rate of return is not possible
in practice because the future aging of the population means that the 10.6 percent tax will not be
enough to finance the benefits projected in current law. Benefits must be cut below their projected
levels or taxes must be increased.   In either case, the net rate of return will be reduced. Although-6-
the retirement of the large baby boom generation that will begin during the coming decade
accelerates this process,  the long-term change in the ratio of retirees to workers reflects the
permanent rise in life expectancy  and the concurrent low birth rate.  The higher cost of the pay-
as-you-go benefits will continue even after the baby boom generation has passed. 
The actuaries of the Social Security Administration estimate that the cost of providing the
benefits specified in current law will rise from 9.1 percent of taxable payroll now to 14.5 percent
in 2030, 15.4 percent in 2050, and 16.6 percent in 2075.  Even with revenues from the income tax
on benefits equal to 0.9 percent of payroll in 2075, the payroll tax rate would have to increase 48
percent  (from today’s 10.6 percent to 15.7 percent) to finance currently projected benefits with 
the present pay-as-you-go structure. Keeping the tax rate unchanged at 10.6 percent would require
cutting benefits by nearly one-third. 
This projected  rise in the tax rate to 15.7 percent understates the increase that would
actually be needed because the increased marginal tax rate would cause individuals to change their
behavior in ways that reduce taxable wages: working less and in less remunerative occupations,
taking more compensation in the form of untaxed fringe benefits and nicer working conditions,
and increasing the spending that can be deducted in calculating taxable income. This induced fall
in taxable wages requires not only  a higher tax rate to finance Social Security benefits but also
higher payroll tax rates for disability and Medicare and higher personal income tax rates to
achieve the currently projected personal income tax revenue.  Plausible estimates of the response
of taxable wages based on recent econometric research (Feldstein, 1995a; Auten and Carrol, 1999;
Gruber and Saez, 2002; Giertz, 2004) implies that tax base would shrink by about 4 percent and2This approximation assumes that the elasticity of taxable wages with respect to the
marginal net-of-tax-share (i.e., one minus the marginal tax rate) is 0.5 and the income effect is
0.15.
3This is based on the current level of DI and Medicare payroll taxes that total 4.7 percent
of payroll.  The changes in demographic structure and in health care costs would actually raise
these costs very substantially over the coming decades, implying that the decline of taxable
wages implied by the higher OASI tax would cause even larger increases in the required overall
tax rate. 
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the OASI payroll tax rate would have to rise to 16.4 percent instead of 15.7 percent
2 and that the
combination of other payroll and income tax rates would  have to rise by an additional 1.3
percentage points.  In total, the marginal tax rate would have to rise not by 5.1 percent (from 10.6
to 15.7) but by 7.1 percent.
3
The prospect of  large tax rate increases or benefit reductions in response to changing
demographic structures has induced governments in many countries to shift from the pure pay-as-
you-go system to a mixed system that includes investment-based personal retirement accounts.
(Even those countries like Chile that say that they have a pure investment-based system provide
various guarantees that imply a de facto mixed system.). As I explain below, the United States
could use such a mixed system to avoid the rise in the tax rate while maintaining expected
retirement incomes at or above the level projected in current law. 
There is no free lunch in such a reform.  Avoiding a future increase in the payroll tax
would require an increase in national saving during the transition.  It could take the form of
additional saving by individuals or an increase in government saving through less spending or
higher taxes. The increased saving need not be large.  The specific calculations described  below
reflect additional saving of about 0.6 percent of GDP. 
Although avoiding a large tax increase or benefit cut is the reason for political interest in4See for example the President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security (2001) and
chapter 6 of the Economic Report of the President for 2004. 
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such a reform, it would also provide economic benefits that can be analyzed separately: an
efficiency gain (i.e., decreased  deadweight loss) associated with reducing labor market distortions
and, separately, an increased present value of consumption due to the shift to a partially
investment-based system. Before discussing these disadvantages, I first describe how a mixed
system could operate and the way in which the transition could be structured and financed.
How a Mixed System Could Work
A mixed system that combines a pay-as-you-go component and an investment-based
portion could be structured in many ways.
4  Differences in plan design affect how the costs and
benefits are distributed over different generations. The following example reflects one of the plans 
that Andrew Samwick and I outlined in our paper, “Potential Paths of Social Security Reform.” 
(Feldstein and Samwick, 2002).  I focus on this particular example not because it is necessarily
the best alternative but because we have done extensive calculations of its implications for future
retirees and for the aggregate budget.
The plan was designed to satisfy five requirements:  (1) Current retirees  receive the full
pay-as-you-go benefits specified in current law. (2) For all future cohorts of retirees, the
combination of pay-as-you-go benefits plus the expected investment-based personal annuities will
equal or exceed the benefits that current law projects for that cohort. (3)  The tax rate and relative
tax base will not be increased.  (4)  The financing solution will be permanent, implying that the
Social Security trust fund in 2075 (the end of the forecast period of  the Social Security actuaries) 
will be both positive and growing. (5) There will be no use of existing general revenue to finance5Feldstein and Samwick (2002) also analyzed several other plans that do not maintain all
of these requirements. In particular, we examined plans that require borrowing general revenue
funds during the transition and show how that borrowing can eventually be repaid. 
6The Feldstein-Samwick quantitative analyses of alternative reforms all leave the
disability insurance (DI) unchanged, using the tax revenue projected by the Social Security
actuaries to meet the obligations of the DI program.  
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Social Security benefits. 
The increased national saving during the transition is achieved by individual out-of-pocket
contributions to personal retirement accounts that raise the nation’s stock of capital through
investments in a mixture of stocks and bonds.
5   This increase in the capital stock generates the
additional real income in the future that permits retirement incomes to be maintained with less
reliance on taxes. 
When the system is fully phased in, each employee would continue to participate in the
pay-as-you-go system and, separately, would contribute to an investment-based personal
retirement account. There would be no change in the current 10.6 percent payroll tax for the Old
Age and Survivor Insurance program.  The disability program would also continue to be financed
and managed separately as it is now
6.   Of the 10.6 percent OASI tax, the government would
transfer 1.5 percent to the personal retirement accounts. The remaining 9.1 percent payroll tax
revenue plus the transfer of the income tax collected on Social Security benefits would, by 2075,
only be able to finance 60 percent of the “benchmark” benefits specified in current law.  To
maintain total retirement income at the benchmark level, the personal retirement account annuities
would therefore  have to be equal to at least 40 percent of the benchmark benefits.   
The personal retirement accounts would be funded by a combination of the 1.5 percent that
was transferred from the payroll tax plus an additional 1.5 percent that individuals would7This equal contribution to the personal retirement accounts is only one possibility. 
Feldstein and Samwick (2002) also consider plans that use general revenue or government
borrowing in place 
of the personal saving.
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contribute out-of-pocket on a voluntary basis.
7  Individuals would be given an incentive to make
this contribution to their accounts by a matching payment, that is, anyone not contributing 1.5
percent out of pocket would not receive the 1.5 percent transfer of payroll tax.  That incentive
might be varied by income class with higher matching rates for those in lower income groups.
Research on  private business experience with 401(k) plans shows that participation rates can be
substantially increased by making participation the “default” option (Choi, Laibson and Madrian,
2004).  This would mean that the employer would automatically deduct an additional 1.5 percent
of payroll for each employee (in addition to the current tax) but employees who chose not to
participate could apply for a refund of the 1.5 percent when they file their income tax return. The
calculations summarized below assume that all employees contribute.  
Personal retirement account balances would have to be invested in diversified equity and
bond mutual funds, similar to the investments allowed in 401(k) plans.  Each individual would
choose an investment firm for his personal retirement account from an approved list of mutual
fund managers, banks, and insurance companies.  The individual could make this designation on
his annual tax return and could change this annually. Rules might specify minimum and
maximum percentages for  equity and debt.  The calculations presented below assume that 60
percent of the personal retirement account balances are invested in a broad equity mutual fund
index (the Standard &Poor’s 500) and 40 percent in a corporate bond fund (equivalent to the
Lehman Baa bond index). The risk implications of these investments and the possibilities for
reducing risk are discussed below.-11-
If an individual dies before reaching retirement age, the assets in his personal retirement
account would be bequeathed to heirs, perhaps with special rules to protect spouses.  Individuals
who are divorced might be required to pool their two accounts at the time of divorce (or the
increase in those accounts during their married years) and divide the total equally.
At retirement age, the individual might be given the choice of annuitizing the accumulated
fund or taking out all or some in cash.  The amount taken out in cash could be limited by requiring
that the remaining annuity provides some minimum replacement of previous earnings.
Continuation of the traditional pay-as-you-go system implies that a substantial pay-as-you-go
annuity would remain even if the individual took the entire personal retirement account
accumulation in cash;  when  the mixed system is fully phased in, the pay-as-you-go benefits
would remain at 60 percent of the currently projected “benchmark” benefits. Policy decisions on
the degree to which annuitization should be mandatory  should depend on further study of the
potential self-selection problem, that is, the extent to which annuities would be bought by those
who have above average life expectancy (McCarthy and Mitchell, 2003; Brown, Mitchell and
Poterba, 2000, Finkelstein and Poterba, 2004). 
The Feldstein-Samwick analysis summarized below assumes complete annuitization
starting at age 67 so that the combination of the personal retirement account annuity and the
reduced pay-as-you-go annuity can be compared  to the benchmark pay-as-you-go benefits
scheduled in current law.  We consider a “variable annuity” in which funds are always invested in
the same 60:40 mix of stocks and bonds. The annuity is subject to a “ten year certain” provision
that continues payments for at least ten years after retirement even if the individual dies during
that interval. Both the form of investment and the use of the ten-year certain annuity could of
course be made matters of individual discretion. 8 More recent calculations show that the mean real return for the period 1945 through
2003 remained at 6.9 percent. The mean real return on equities was 8.7 percent and the mean real
return on the bond index was 4.4 percent, implying that a 60:40 weighted average had a mean of
6.9 percent.  Although the future returns might not be as favorable, the relatively stable historic
average pretax marginal product of capital in the corporate sector of about 9 percent (Poterba,
1998) and an effective federal-state-local tax on corporate capital income of less than 30 percent
imply a real return of more than 6 percent to be divided between debt and equity investors before
personal taxes. 
The major increase in capital accumulation implied by the PRAs would eventually
depress the marginal product of capital and therefore the rate of return on financial assets.  But
even in the very long run and with the extreme assumption that all of the additional saving is
added to the domestic U.S. business capital stock,  the rate of return would only decline by about
one percentage point.  More realistic assumptions about the investment of the additional saving
would imply an even smaller effect on the rate of return. 
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To evaluate this mixed system, Feldstein and Samwick (2002) used the demographic and
economic projections of the Social Security actuaries (2001 Social Security Trustees Report).   A
portfolio invested 60 percent in the Standard and Poors 500 index of common stock and 40
percent in a portfolio of corporate bonds during the fifty year period through 1995 had a mean real
return of 6.9 percent.
8
Feldstein and Samwick (2002) shows that the expected  benefits for individuals with
average lifetime earnings who reach normal retirement age in 2050 would be 121 percent of the
benchmark benefits scheduled in current law, consisting of a personal retirement account annuity
equal to 61 percent of the benchmark benefit and a pay-as-you-go benefit equal to 60 percent of
the benchmark benefit. By 2075, the total would reach 135 percent of benchmark benefits with 75
percent of the benchmark coming from the annuity.  The OASI trust fund balance would remain
positive in every year; by 2075 it would be 55 percent of payroll and rising in a way that would
allow either an increase in benefits, a reduction of the pay-as-you-go tax, or a decrease in personal
saving contributions to the personal retirement accounts.
The assets accumulated in the personal retirement accounts would reach 125 percent of9The transfer from the Treasury to the Social Security  trust fund would not be a transfer
of existing revenue but only of new revenue created as a result of the personal retirement account
system. An appropriate transfer can be estimated by assuming a pretax real return of 8.5 percent
and an effective corporate tax rate of 29 percent, implying that the government should receive 2.5
percent of the incremental U.S. corporate capital.  With the conservative assumption that only
one-third of the personal retirement account balances are a net addition to corporate capital, the
transfer to the trust fund would be 0.83 percent of the aggregate assets in the personal retirement
accounts.
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payroll (about 50 percent of GDP) in 2030 and 260 percent of payroll (or about 100 percent of
GDP) in 2060.  Not all of these assets would represent incremental saving (since those who
contribute to personal retirement accounts might reduce other saving) and, of the incremental
saving, not all would be invested in the U.S. business capital stock (some would go into owner-
occupied housing, to investment overseas,  or to replace foreign investment that would otherwise
come to the United States).  To the extent that increased domestic business investments does
occur, the additional profits would lead to additional corporate taxes.  Our calculations assume
that a portion of those additional taxes would be transferred by the Treasury to the Social Security
trust fund. To be very conservative, the transfer is based on the assumption that only one third of
the personal retirement account assets becomes new business investment in the United States.
9
The Cost of Transition to a Mixed System
Many economists and policy analysts acknowledge the long-run advantages of shifting
from a pure pay-as-you-go system to a mixed system but believe that the transition involves
unacceptable costs.  This is often summarized by saying that the transition generation would have
to pay “double” – to finance the Social Security benefits of current retirees and to save for its own
retirement. Fortunately, the transition is much more manageable than these criticisms suggest. It is
possible to slow the growth of the pay-as-you-go benefits (relative to the path projected in current
law) in such a gradual way that the combination of the remaining  pay-as-you-go benefits and the10In Feldstein (1998) I described how “recognition bonds” of the type used in Chile could
be used to manage the transition.  I now believe that that is not necessary and would not be
helpful.
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expected personal retirement account annuities financed with new saving of only 1.5 percent of
taxable payroll (about 0.6 percent of GDP) would be equal to or greater than the benchmark
benefits projected in current law.
10 
The Feldstein-Samwick analysis showed one way that this could be done.  Although the
assignment of 1.5 percentage points of  payroll tax to the personal retirement accounts reduces the
inflow to the trust fund, the slower growth of benefits reduces the outflow as well.  The trust fund
declines more rapidly at first than it would under current law but the pace of decline eventually
slows and the trust fund begins to rise.  In our analysis, the trust fund remains positive in every
year and is increasing strongly after the transition is complete.
Although the shift of payroll tax funds to the personal retirement accounts temporarily
increases the budget deficit, it does not reduce overall national saving because the decrease in the
net tax revenue is exactly matched by the transfer of funds to the personal retirement accounts.
The national income statistics would record equal decreases in government saving and increases
in private saving with no net impact on national saving. Indeed, the plan as a whole is likely to
increase national saving for several reasons. The larger  budget deficit would bring pressure to
control government spending. The additional out-of-pocket saving that individuals do to qualify
for the matching transfer of payroll tax revenue would further add to national saving. Although
individuals could in principle reduce other saving to offset part of their personal retirement
account contributions, there would be little reason to do so since their personal retirement account
saving is needed to balance the slower growth of the pay-as-you-go benefits. 
There are of course many ways to slow the growth of the pay-as-you-go benefits to the-15-
amount that can be financed without raising the payroll tax or causing the trust fund to borrow.
The Feldstein-Samwick plan keeps the combination of expected annuities and pay-as-you-go
benefits in each year at least equal to the benchmark benefits scheduled in current law by applying
the following transition formula to everyone not retired when the transition begins (although in
practice there would probably be a phase-in period of as much as 10 years to avoid excessively
small accounts): pay-as-you-go benefits are reduced  by 0.3 percent per year during the first   five
years of the program, by 0.6 percent for the next five years, followed by 0.9 percent and 1.2
percent and eventually 1.5 percent per year up to a cumulative maximum reduction of 40 percent
from the benchmark level of benefits. This achieves the long-term adjustment of pay-as-you-go
benefits that is needed to avoid any increase in the 10.6 percent OASI tax rate. With this path of
pay-as-you-go benefits, the combined benefits would be slightly greater than 100 percent of the
benchmark for all those who reach normal retirement age during the next 35 years and would then
begin to increase substantially.  When today’s 21 year-old retires, he would receive only 60
percent of his benchmark benefit from the pay-as-you-go portion but the combined amount would
exceed the benchmark benefits by 20 percent. In short, a transition path can be designed so that
there are no reductions in expected retirement incomes of future retirees and no macroeconomic
budget dislocations. 
Alternative transition paths can avoid any out-of-pocket individual contributions and still
achieve the necessary increase in saving that permits the gradual substitution of personal
retirement account annuities for pay-as-you-go benefits. This is even true of a transition in which
the initial personal retirement account deposits are financed by government borrowing with no
out-of-pocket personal saving. The initial deposit to personal retirement accounts financed by
government borrowing would have no concurrent net effect on national saving because the11Feldstein and Liebman (2002a, section 7.1.3) uses an overlapping generation model to
show how such a debt financed transition could raise saving and therefore the present value of
consumption. The rise in saving does not happen in the first period but begins after that. The debt
service on the initial borrowing cannot be financed by additional borrowing alone; the growth of
the debt must be less than the growth of the economy. 
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increased budget deficit would be offset by the deposit of those funds into the personal retirement
accounts.  But, over time, the availability of the personal retirement account annuities would
permit reducing the pay-as-you-go benefits (relative to those projected in current law) without
lowering total retirement income. This reduction in the pay-as-you-go benefits would mean that
the annual rise in the budget deficit would be less than the amount transferred to the personal
retirement accounts.  This difference would be an increase in national saving that would grow
over time.
11
Before commenting on the three problems that concern the critics of investment-based
plans - - administration costs, risk, and income distribution -- I turn now to discuss the
fundamental economic gains from shifting from the current pure pay-as-you-go system to a mixed
system. A reader who wants to skip the analysis of the economic advantages and go directly to the
discussion of these three criticisms can do so without losing anything needed to understand the
later part of the paper. For a more complete treatment of these issues, see the  Feldstein and
Liebman (2002a) chapter on Social Security in volume 4 of the Handbook of Public Economics
(Auerbach and Feldstein, 2002).
Avoiding an Increase in  Labor Market Distortions
Increasing the OASI payroll tax rate from 10.6 percent to 16.4 percent (and raising the
other tax rates to maintain the currently projected  revenue as the tax base shrinks in response to
higher marginal tax rates)  would cause a major rise in the deadweight loss of the tax system equal
to about 40 percent of the incremental payroll tax revenue.  Shifting to a mixed system that avoids12The full additional tax, as noted on page 6 above, is 1.3 percent.  Since only 0.3 percent
of this is a rise in the other payroll taxes that are affected by the employer exclusion, the net
effect is an increase of 1.25 percent.  
-17-
the rise in the OASI payroll tax rate would eliminate that permanent rise in the deadweight loss. 
This section discusses the calculation of that extra avoidable deadweight loss. 
Three adjustments must be made to calculate the relevant tax rates for this calculation.
First, because the half of the payroll tax that is paid by the employer is excluded from the
individual’s taxable income, the effective rise in the marginal tax rate is 4.9 percent instead of the
5.8 percent implied by comparing the 10.6 and 16.4 percent tax rates. The other marginal tax rate
increases that are induced by the need to offset the shrinking tax base increases this rise to 6.15
percent.
12
A similar correction is also needed to assess the effective marginal tax rate without the
increase.  Of the 15.3 percent current total payroll tax, the employer’s share is 7.65 percent.  For
someone who pays a 30 percent marginal income tax rate, this corresponds to a net   payroll tax of
5.35 percent. Combining that with the 7.65 percent paid by the individual implies a base net
payroll tax of 13 percent.  The full marginal tax rate for such an individual is 43 percent.  
One further adjustment is needed to calculate the current net  marginal tax rate.  The
present actuarial value of the additional benefits that result from increased earnings must be
subtracted from the 43 percent to obtain the net marginal federal-state rate. This value of
additional benefits varies substantially from zero for some groups of workers (young workers and
dependent spouses), to more than the incremental tax for older individuals with dependent
spouses (Feldstein and Samwick, 1992). The Feldstein-Samwick (1992) calculations suggest a
value of about 5 cents per extra dollar of taxable earnings, reducing the 43 percent marginal tax
rate to 38 percent.-18-
In contrast, the increase in the payroll tax rate needed to deal with the demographic change
would not bring any additional benefits.  The relevant marginal tax rate therefore rises from 38
percent to about 44 percent.  
Since the deadweight loss of the tax system is approximately proportional to the square of
the marginal tax rate, the increase in the marginal tax rate from 38 percent to 44 percent would
raise the deadweight loss of the current combined personal income tax and payroll tax by about 35
percent.  The actual magnitude of the additional deadweight loss depends on the relevant
behavioral elasticity and is proportional to the size of the tax base. 
The elasticity that determines the deadweight loss is the elasticity of taxable labor income
with respect to the individual’s net of tax share, that is, to one minus the marginal tax rate
(Feldstein, 1999).  The responsiveness of taxable labor income is much greater than the traditional
elasticity of  working hours with respect to the net wage.   The relevant measure of labor supply
that affects taxable labor income includes not only participation and average hours but also effort,
occupational choice, risk taking, and so on. In addition, taxable labor income depends on how 
much of the potential income is taken in cash and how much in fringe benefits, nice working
conditions, and other forms that are not taxable income. It is not possible to estimate these
distortions separately, but since the prices of “leisure” (broadly defined) and of the tax-free forms
of compensation are all equal to one minus the marginal tax rate, their sum (and therefore overall
taxable income) is a “Hicksian composite good” that can be treated as a single good for the
purpose of calculating the deadweight loss of distorting taxes.  Recent research suggests that a
reasonable estimate of the long-term compensated elasticity of taxable labor income with respect
to the after-tax share (i.e., to one minus the marginal tax rate) is 0.5 (Feldstein, 1995a; Auten and
Carrol, 1999; Gruber and Saez, 2002; Giertz, 2004). -19-
Using the traditional approximation of the deadweight loss,  the increase in the deadweight
loss when the marginal tax rate rises from  t1  to t2  is given by: 
change in deadweight loss = 0.5 E (t
2
2  - t
2
 1 ) B / (1 -t1 )
 where E is the relevant elasticity,  B is the tax base, t1 = 0.38 (the initial marginal tax rate) and t2 
= 0.44  (the rate after the tax increase).  With E = 0.5, the change in the deadweight loss is 2
percent of the tax base.  Since the additional revenue to be raised is 5.1 percent of the tax base (the
difference between the current 10.6 percent and the needed 15.7 percent), the additional
deadweight loss is 40 percent of the revenue that needs to be raised.  
Shifting to a mixed system with an investment-based component would make it possible
to avoid the payroll tax increase and the associated deadweight loss while maintaining the
expected  level of pension benefits. The reduction in the deadweight loss due to avoiding the
increased labor market distortion would be a true improvement in long-run economic efficiency. 
Although achieving this would require a temporary increase in saving, if individuals receive the
same rate of return that they would get in an IRA or 401k, there would be little or no deadweight
loss associated with the increase in saving.  The only deadweight loss that would occur would be
the result of requiring some individuals  to save more than they would prefer to save even at the
higher rate of return that the PRAs allow.  Individuals who are constrained by dollar limits on IRA
and 401(k) contributions would see the increased saving opportunity in the PRAs with a tax-
favored rate of return as a positive benefit.
The Increase in Saving and in the Intergenerational Present Value of Consumption
Adding an investment-based component to Social Security would reduce the present value
cost of maintaining the currently projected retirement benefits.  More specifically, it would reduce
the discounted present value of the pay-as-you-go taxes plus the personal retirement account13The full marginal product of capital on the funds created by the personal retirement
account would be about 9 percent.  Assuming a return of 6 percent can be regarded as focusing
on the after-tax return to the individual and ignoring the extra 3 percent that accrues to the nation
in the form of taxes.  An alternative interpretation is that the 6 percent return is the certainty
equivalent return to the nation associated with the mean risky return of 9 percent; the calculations
underlying this are discussed in my 1996 Ely Lecture (Feldstein, 1996) and in the Risk section
below.
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saving needed to finance the currently projected benefits.  Equivalently, the adoption of the
investment-based component in the Social Security system would raise the present value of
private  consumption discounted over all current and future generations. This increased present
value does not imply a Pareto improvement that makes all generations better off, but it is a useful
summary measure of the impact of adopting an investment-based program.
Although this increase in the present value of consumption under realistic assumptions  is
straightforward to prove, few aspects of the Social Security reform debate have created as much
confusion as this basic proposition. The confusion arises because in a simple textbook case there
is no present value gain.  But with a more realistic description of the economy that takes into
account the existence of capital income taxes, the present value gain becomes clear.
Before describing this present value calculation, consider the magnitude of the gain in
steady state (i.e., after the transition) from substituting an investment-based component for the
increase in the payroll tax that would otherwise be needed to finance future benefits.  More
specifically, consider the advantage to an employee who shifts his saving for retirement from a
pay-as-you-go system with a 2 percent Samuelsonian  real rate of return to an investment-based
system with a real rate of return of 6 percent.
13 The individual starts working at age 25, retires at
65 and lives until 85.  The implications of the two interest  rates can be approximated by assuming
that all of the “contributions” for retirement occur at age 45 (in the middle of the working life) and
all of the retirement income is paid out at age 75 (in the middle of the retirement period).  With an-21-
implicit rate of return of 2 percent, $100 saved at age 45 grows to $181 at age 75.  If the
individual could obtain a rate of return of 6 percent instead, the same $181 at age 75 could be
obtained by saving only $32 at age 45.  Applying this 32 percent  ratio to the payroll tax rate, the 6
percent rise in the payroll tax rate required in the long run to maintain benefits with a pure pay-as-
you-go system could be replaced by real savings of only 1.92 percent of payroll.  
This focus on the long run ignores the need to finance benefits during the transition years
for those who have been paying into the pay-as-you-go system. I have already discussed the
feasibility of such a transition in an earlier section.  Now I want to focus on the question of
whether  shifting from a  pay-as-you-go system to an  investment-based system increases the
present  value of consumption over all generations. Equivalently, does the introduction of a pay-
as-you-go system that replaces private saving reduce the present value of consumption over all
generations?  
Consider first the textbook case in which there are no taxes on capital income. Following
Samuelson (1958), each individual lives for two periods, working in the first and being retired in
the second.  Consider the introduction of a pay-as-you-go Social Security system with the initial
tax collection paid to the concurrent generation of retirees. Let r be the marginal product of capital
in the economy and let g be the implicit rate of return on the pay-as-you-go accounts (the rate of
growth of the payroll tax base).  If the first generation of taxpayers pays a payroll tax of T in the
pay-as-you-go program, it receives (1 + g)  T in retirement.  If it had instead saved and invested
the amount T in economic assets, it would have received (1+ r) T in retirement.  The loss of return
to this first generation of taxpayers is therefore (r -g) T.  The  present value of this loss at the first14This shows that there would be no loss if the economy were at the “golden rule” point
where the rate of growth is equal to the marginal product of capital. The United States is very far
from the golden rule point with the annual growth rate of 3 percent and the annual marginal
product of capital of about 9 percent. 
15To see this, note first that,  with a constant proportional tax rate on wage income, the
amount of tax paid grows over time from one generation to the next with the increasing size of
the  tax base, reflecting the increase in the number of workers and in their average wage.   The
tax for generation t is therefore (1 + g) 
t   T.  The loss to that generation is  (1 + g) 
t T (r - g)/(1+r).  
The present value of the losses over all the taxpaying generations, discounting at the marginal
product of capital,  is therefore
￿ t = 0  ( 1 +r) 
- t (1 +g)
t T[( r  - g )  / (1+ r)] =
  T [( r  - g )  / (1+ r)]  ￿ t = 0  ( 1 + r) 
- t (1 + g)
t
Since the infinite sum  S t = 0  ( 1 +r) 
- t (1 + g)
t equals ( 1 + r) /(r-g), the present value of the losses
over all taxpaying generations is T [( r  - g )  / (1+ r)] { ( 1 + r) /(r  - g )} = T.
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period of this generation’s life is (r - g)T/(1 + r). 
14
In this simple model, the discounted present value of these losses over all generations of
taxpayers is just equal to the initial windfall benefit, T, received by those who are retired when the
pay-as-you-go program begins.
15  In this textbook case the introduction of the pay-as-you-go
system just transfers income from future generations to the initial one. This result, which has been
derived many times before (Feldstein, 1995b; Murphy and Welch, 1998; Geanakoplos et al 1998),
assumes that there are no capital income taxes and that the appropriate discount rate for
aggregating consumption over all future generations is the marginal product of capital.  Neither of
these assumptions is defensible. 
With more realistic assumptions, the gain to the initial generation from creating a pay-as-
you-go system would be much less than the present value of the losses to all future generations. 
One reason for this difference is that each taxpaying individual should calculate the present value15A pretax marginal product of capital of r = 0.085 and corporate and personal tax rates of
30 percent each imply r n = 0.042.    
16 The value of d measures the time discounting implied by the social welfare function,
i.e., 1 + d is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in adjacent generations.  If
per capita consumption grows at 2 percent a year and the social welfare function has an elasticity
of the marginal utility of consumption of 2, the marginal utility declines at 4 percent per year.
17The loss to generation t is (1 + g)
t T (r - g) / (1 + rn) and the present value of the losses
for all taxpaying generations is 
￿t = 0 (1 + d) 
- t  (1 + g) 
 t T (r - g) /( 1 +  r n ) = {(r  - g ) /(d - g) } [ (1 + d ) / (1 +  r n ) ] T
For realistic values (with d less than or equal to r n  and r n   less than r),  this expression is
substantially larger than T, implying that the present value loss to all generations of taxpayers
exceeds the windfall to the initial generation.  Note that this assumes that generation t would
otherwise have received the full benefit of its saving, r(1+g)
t T, even though the net investment
income would be just rn(1+g)
t T.  This implies that the capital income tax revenue would be spent
on that generation. A more general distribution of the tax revenue between the two generations
would complicate the analysis without changing the basic conclusion.) 
Some illustrative values will indicate the potential magnitude of this difference.  Since
this is a model in which individuals live only two periods, the various rates of return should be
thought of as returns for roughly 30 years.  Thus if the annual marginal product of capital is 9
percent, 1 + r = (1.09) 
30   = 13.3, implying r  = 12.3.  Similarly, if the annual rate of growth of the
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 of his lost retirement income by using the real net of tax rate of return (rn), a number substantially
smaller than the marginal product of capital assumed in the simpler model.
15  A second reason is
that (in the absence of optimal lump sum intergenerational redistributions) the discount rate that is
appropriate for aggregating the consumption of different generations must reflect a social welfare
function judgement rather than being the marginal product of capital. More specifically,
aggregating the consumption of different generations should reflect the rate of decline of the
marginal utility of consumption.   For any realistic values of the elasticity of the marginal utility of
consumption and the rate of growth of consumption, this intergenerational consumption discount
rate (d) would be substantially less than the marginal product of capital.
16  Using these values of
(rn) and d to discount future losses implies that the present value of loss to all generations of
taxpayers exceeds the windfall to the initial generation.
17tax base is 3 percent , g =  (1.03) 
30  - 1 = 1.43.  With the annual net return equal to 4 percent, 
 r n =  (1.04) 
30  - 1 = 2.24.  With the intergenerational discount rate based on a 4 percent per year
rate of decline of the marginal utility of consumption, d = (1.04) 
30  - 1 = 2.24.  Substituting these
into the expression in the text implies a present  value loss to all taxpaying generations of 13.4 T,
substantially greater than the initial windfall gain of T. 
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  In short, although the political interest in the shift to mixed systems that is seen around the
world reflects the budget implications of the aging population, the positive economic
consequences of such a shift are to raise the present value of consumption and to reduce labor
market distortions.
Administrative Costs
Critics of investment-based plans sometimes argue that high administrative costs will
absorb much of the difference in rates of return between pay-as-you-go and investment-based
plans. Although some countries have experienced high administrative costs, the favorable
experience in other countries and of our own mutual funds makes this claim unconvincing.
Sweden recently created a mixed system with contributions equal to 2 percent of payroll.
Participants are offered a very large number of investment alternatives, including actively
managed equity funds that invest abroad.  The average administrative cost of these plans is only
about 0.8 percent of assets. As assets grow and the need for  marketing expenses declines, these
administrative costs should decline as a percent of assets.
In the United States, TIAA-CREF offers plans that allow individuals to accumulate stock-
bond mutual funds in a pension account and to convert the accumulated balance at retirement to a
variable annuity .  Despite selling costs and rules that allow frequent portfolio shifts, TIAA-CREF
is able to offer this product with a  fee of less than 0.4 percent of assets.  The President’s
Commission to Strengthen Social Security uses estimates provided by the Social Security Office
of the Actuary that the administrative cost of an investment-based system with individual accounts-25-
could be kept to between 0.3 percent of assets and 1.0 percent of assets, depending on the
particular administrative arrangements. 
Since the assets that would be in the investment-based plans have had an historic real rate
of return of 6.9 percent while the Social Security actuaries project that the implicit real rate of
return on Social Security contributions  for someone entering work now would realistically be less 
than two percent , the administrative costs cannot absorb a major part of the yield difference.
The key determinants of the administrative costs of any mutual fund (and therefore of a
personal retirement account system) are in marketing, in the collection of the funds, in the
frequency with which investments can be changed from one investment manager to another, and
in the extent to which individuals can talk to staff at the fund manager (Shoven, 2000; Goldberg
and Graetz, 2000 ).  Having the Social Security Administration collect funds from employers and
transfer them to money managers would achieve substantial cost savings as would limiting the
frequency with which funds can be changed from one fund manager to another. 
The notoriously high administrative costs in some Latin American countries reflect an
incentive structure that causes individuals to disregard costs when choosing among plans. The
Mexican plan provides that someone who entered in the early years of the plan has the option at
retirement age to surrender his  personal retirement account assets and receive the benefits that he
would have received under the old pay-as-you-go system.  Since someone who was 50 years old
or older when the new system began could not possibly accumulate more in his investment
account than he would be entitled to under the old rules, the cost and return in the personal
accounts was irrelevant.  Any promotional gift or other incentive to choose a particular plan or to
change plans could therefore draw individuals to a high cost plan. There is no reason, however, to
assume that such a problem would keep costs high in the United States.-26-
Risk
Pay-as-you-go benefits and investment-based benefits are both inherently uncertain. The
possibility of substantial reductions in future U.S. Social Security benefits or increases in the
normal retirement age shows that pay-as-you-go benefits are uncertain in a world of unpredictable 
demographics and unreliable politics.  Mc Hale (2001) and Feldstein and Siebert (2002) discuss a
number of countries that reduced pay-as-you-go benefits.  More recently, Germany and Japan
have joined the list of countries that have cut benefits or announced future benefit reductions. 
Investment-based accounts are of course subject to market risk, but these market risks can
be quantified and can be reduced by investment strategies. Moreover, since the nature of the pay-
as-you-go uncertainty is fundamentally different from the uncertainty in an investment-based
system, a mixed system that combines both types of benefits may provide greater protection than a
pure pay-as-you-go system or a pure investment-based system.
How should the riskiness of investment assets be taken into account in evaluating their use
in financing future pension benefits? It is wrong to argue, as some have, that the returns on stocks
and bonds in a personal retirement account should be evaluated as if they were risk-free
government bonds since (their argument goes) any higher expected return is just a compensation
for risk.  That argument assumes that individuals have already optimized the degree of risk in their
portfolios and are therefore indifferent at the margin between the risky and riskless assets. If so,
the “certainty equivalent” return on the risky stock-bond portfolio is the same as the return on the
riskless asset.   I believe that analysis is unconvincing for two reasons. (Feldstein, 1996).   
First, about half of American households own no equities.  I believe that is not because
they are too risk averse, but rather because their total assets are so small in value that it would not
be worth the time and effort to learn to invest in stocks or mutual funds.  For such households, the-27-
“certainty equivalent” return on a small investment is its expected value and the certainty
equivalent of subsequent investments exceeds the risk-free rate of return.   
Second, a substantial fraction of the return on risky real investments in corporate capital is
taken by the federal, state and local governments in taxes.  The government then spreads the risk
of these returns over all taxpayers and recipients of government services, a group that includes
many with little or no financial  wealth and therefore who can be risk neutral for moderate
amounts of “their share” in this return. In Feldstein (1996) I discussed why the certainty
equivalent of the real pretax risky return on additions to the corporate capital stock could be about
6 percent.  
One crude but useful way to assess the risk of introducing an investment-based component
in the U.S. Social Security system is to ask what would happen if future rates of return on stocks
and bonds were very much less than they were in the past. Feldstein and Samwick (2002,. Table
6) calculated the combined benefits that would result with the plan described above (funded by
1.5 percent of payroll from the payroll tax and an equal amount of private saving) if the rate of
return in the personal retirement accounts was consistently only half of the historic 6.9 percent
average.  Even in this extreme case, the combined benefits would be at least 95 percent of the
benchmark benefit for those who reach normal retirement age in the first 20 years of the mixed
program, an outcome that reflects the fact that the mixed program is still largely pay-as-you-go
during that period.  In the long run, after 50 years, the combined benefits would be at least 90
percent of the benchmark, reflecting the relatively high expected investment-based benefits even
with the low return. The worst projected  performance occurs in the 35
th year of the program when
the combined benefits would replace 84  percent of the benchmark benefits. 
A more sophisticated way to assess the riskiness of the mixed program is to look at the full18Our calculation was of a pure investment-based plan but the distribution of a mixed plan
can be estimated by assuming that the pay-as-you-go benefit is paid with certainty. The reliability
of such future pay-as-you-go benefits is enhanced by eliminating the need for any future tax
increase.
19The simulation procedure recognizes that the historic mean is only a sample estimate by
using a  two-level simulation procedure in which a mean return is drawn for each “individual”
from a distribution with the 5.5 percent mean and a standard deviation equal to the standard error
of that estimate.  A lifetime of individual returns (i.e., from age 21 to100) are then drawn with
that mean and a standard deviation of 12.5 percent.  The process is repeated 10,000 times to get
the distribution.  
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probability distribution of potential outcomes as measured by the ratio of the combined benefits to
the benchmark of currently “scheduled” benefits.  Feldstein and Ranguelova (2001) provide the
information needed for this calculation.
18  We did 10,000 simulations to obtain the fully phased-in
distribution of pure personal retirement account benefits based on a very conservative real mean
return of 5.5 percent and a standard deviation of 12.5 percent,  the historic standard deviation of a
continually rebalanced 60:40 equity-debt portfolio.
19  If these pure investment-based results are
combined with a pure pay-as-you-go benefit equal to 60 percent of the projected “benchmark”
benefit, we find that at the lowest 10
th percentile, the combined benefit would equal 88 percent of
the benchmark benefit.  Even at the lowest one percent level, the combined benefit would still
equal 70 percent of the benchmark benefit. 
A government guarantee could reduce this risk further.  Feldstein, Ranguelova and
Samwick (2000) explored the cost of a government guarantee in the extreme case of a pure
investment-based plan ( with no pay-as-you-go component).   The analysis, which  assumed that
the individuals invest in the standard 60:40 stock-bond portfolio, found that even with no pay-as-
you-go component, the potential cost to taxpayers of guaranteeing an annuity at least equal to the
benchmark benefits would be very small (a 70 percent chance that no guarantee payment would be
needed in a typical year and only a one percent chance that the combination of the personal-29-
retirement account saving and the government guarantee payment would exceed 14 percent of
payroll, less than the tax rate needed in the pure pay-as-you-go system).   In practice, the guarantee
would not require individuals to invest in this standard portfolio as long as the guarantee was paid
only if the  “standard 60:40 portfolio” failed to produce benefits equal to the benchmark.  This
would avoid the moral hazard problems of individuals seeking risky investments because of the
guarantee and not seeking low cost providers.  
More recently, I have been exploring how the private market could provide guarantees that
reduced the risk of the investment-based plans.  One possibility is to include enough long-term
government inflation indexed bonds in the portfolio to guarantee no loss of principal.  For
example, a personal retirement account manager (an insurance firm, bank or mutual fund) could
guarantee a 30 year old that the funds that he saved that year would at least retain their real value
to age 67  by investing about 60 percent of the funds in such bonds and the rest in equities.  The
expected performance of that investment (based on past experience) would be a real rate of return
of 4.7 percent, substantially higher than the implicit yield on Social Security.  A simulation of
making that type of investment at every age, as part of a mixed Social Security plan, shows a high
probability that the resulting annuities would be substantially greater than the benchmark benefits
and that the probability that the annuity would be less than 90 percent of the benchmark benefit is
less than one percent. The personal retirement account managers could also offer other risk
profiles by using no-net-cost derivatives. (Feldstein, 2005b)
In short, the expected annuities produced by a mixed system would be substantially larger
than the benchmark pay-as-you-go benefits while requiring a much smaller increase in
contributions (taxes plus saving) .  The risk that this combined annuity would be substantially less
than the benchmark benefits is very small.  -30-
Income Distribution Effects
Some opponents of a mixed Social Security system are concerned that investment-based
accounts would weaken what they perceive as the redistributive character of the current Social
Security program. In fact, although the formula relating Social Security benefits to past earnings
appears to provide substantial redistribution from higher income earners to those with below
average earnings, several studies have now documented that very little net redistribution occurs 
(Gustman and Steinmeier, 2001; Liebman, 2002; Coronado, Fullerton and Glass, 2000). This is
because individuals with high lifetime incomes have lower mortality rates and therefore more
retirement benefit years, start working and paying tax at a later age, and are more likely to take
advantage of spouse benefits.  Thus, an investment-based component in which all employees
contribute the same proportion of their earnings and experience the same rate of return would  not
be very different from the current system in its distributional effect. 
Despite nearly $500 billion of Social Security benefits in 2004 and the additional outlays
for the means tested Supplementary Security Income program, about 10 percent of those over age
65 remain in poverty.  Groups with high poverty rates include women who are widowed or
divorced, especially those who are widowed or divorced before age 50. Feldstein and Liebman
(2002b) show how such women would benefit by inheriting the personal retirement account of
their deceased husband or by splitting their two accounts at the time of divorce.  
A mixed system could be designed to provide greater redistribution. For example, the 
matching rate used to induce participation could be higher for low income earners. The pay-as-
you-go formula and  the rate at which benefits are adjusted over time could also be modified to
increase progressivity. 
The redistributive effect of the Social Security program depends of course on the tax as20Diamond and Orzag (2004) propose tax increases about three times as large as the net
benefit reductions. These proposed  tax increases fall primarily on above average earners, 
achieved by raising the maximum taxable earnings and imposing a special tax on earnings above
the maximum. The income-related reductions in benefits also increase the deadweight loss of the
program. 
Another piece of the Diamond-Orzag proposal is to levy Social Security taxes on state
and local workers.  Although they discuss the “fairness” of imposing this additional  burden on
those workers, the actual incidence would presumably be on the state and local governments and
their taxpayers. Since the state and local employees are free to choose whether to work in the
public or private sector, the current wage difference should already reflect the advantage of not
paying a payroll tax in the state and local sector.
-31-
well as on the benefits. More than 50 percent of households now pay more in payroll tax than
income tax. It is difficult to think of any plausible tax policy that would benefit this group more
than avoiding the sharp  rise in their payroll taxes. 
Ad Hoc Changes without Structural Reform
While everyone now recognizes that some change is necessary to maintain the solvency of
Social Security, some economists and policy analysts reject any structural change of the program
and would prefer to achieve solvency by a combination of tax increases and benefit reductions. 
These proposed changes generally emphasize tax increases aimed at higher income employees.
20
One simple proposal that was popular a few years ago called for a two percentage point
increase in the payroll tax to eliminate the “75 year deficit” of the program, that is, raising the 
payroll tax by two percentage points would increase the trust fund balance and permit it to earn
enough interest on its investment in government bonds to be able to continue paying benefits for
75 years.  We hear less about such a plan today because it is now generally recognized that the 75-
year deficit would only disappear for a single year.  After one year, a 75-year deficit would return
because of the large deficit that initially existed in the 76
th year.  More importantly, at year 75 it
would be necessary to raise the tax rate to more than 16 percent or to cut benefits sharply.  The
two-percent plan would increase the deadweight loss due to higher marginal tax rates from year21The deadweight loss is proportional to the square of the marginal tax rate.  An
individual who earns $100,000 now faces a marginal tax rate of about 33 percent (a federal rate
of 25 percent, a state rate of 5 percent, the medicare payroll tax rate of 3 percent ). Imposing the
12.4 percent payroll tax on the currently excluded income (the 2.9 percent Medicare tax is
currently levied on all earnings) would raise the marginal tax rate for these individuals by 10.5
percent because the employer tax of 6.2 percent would reduce the federal and state income tax by
30 percent of that amount.  Increasing the marginal rate from 33 percent to about 43 percent
would cause the deadweight loss to rise by 70 percent.  
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one but would not solve the long-run problem. Even the medium term solution would only be
economically meaningful if the extra 2 percent tax revenue actually led to reductions in total
budget deficits or increases in saving so that the capital stock grew. Past experience with Social
Security surpluses does not give any reason to believe that this would occur. Fortunately, the two
percent tax plan is no longer being actively proposed. 
Another very widespread idea is to increase the ceiling on earnings subject to the payroll
tax (e.g., Diamond and Orzag, 2004). Such a change would raise the marginal tax rate for the
affected individuals from 33 percent now to about 43 percent, causing the deadweight loss of the
tax system to rise by 70 percent for these individuals.
21  Although an increase in the maximum
income subject to the Social Security tax would raise additional payroll tax revenue, almost all of
this extra revenue would be offset by lower personal income tax revenue.  As I discussed earlier, a
higher marginal tax rate would reduce taxable income by lowering labor supply and changing the
form of compensation to untaxed fringe benefits.  This would not only shrink the base of the
payroll tax but would also reduce the income subject to other taxes. With the help of my NBER
colleague Dan Feenberg, I used the NBER Taxsim model (a sample of about 100,000 anonymous
individual tax returns provided by the Treasury Department) to evaluate the effect of raising the
$87,900 ceiling to $120,000.  With no behavioral response, the payroll tax would rise by $19
billion at the 2004 level of incomes.  But changes in behavior (assuming a conservative estimate-33-
of 0.4 for the compensated elasticity of taxable labor income with respect to the net of tax rate and
an income effect of 0.15) would shrink the additional payroll tax revenue to $16 billion and cause
the federal and state personal income tax revenue and the Medicare payroll revenue to fall by
about $11 billion. This means that more than two-thirds of the $16 billion increase in Social
Security revenue comes at the expense of reduced funds for general revenue and for the Medicare
trust fund.  The combination of a sharp increase in the deadweight loss and little additional
revenue makes this a very unattractive option.
A Central Investment Account
A quite different proposal would create a mixed system in which the investments in real
capital through stocks and bonds would be in the Social Security trust fund.  This would be
fundamentally different from the current pay-as-you-go system in which the government uses the
trust fund to finance other forms of government spending. Aaron and Reischauer (1998)
developed such a proposal in detail.  In a formal sense, this could have the same economic
advantages on national saving and labor market deadweight loss as the personal retirement
accounts. 
But a central investment account in Social Security would raise a very serious risk of
government interference in the economy.   Recall that by about 2030 the 3 percent contribution
plan described above (with 1.5 percent  from the payroll tax revenue and 1.5 percent from
individual saving) would create assets in personal retirement  accounts equal to 50 percent of
GDP or nearly $6 trillion at the income level of 2004.  That much asset ownership by the Social
Security trust fund would bring substantial control over the economy and over individual firms. 
There would undoubtedly be political pressure not to invest in firms that are engaged in unfavored
activities (outsourcing, overseas investment, producing products like cigarettes) and pressure to-34-
make “social investments” ( infrastructure, low income housing, pollution control).  The
government fund managers would also face difficult decisions about how to vote shares or deal
with bonds, especially during mergers or bankruptcies that would affect employment in local
areas.  
It is hard to imagine any set of safeguards that would protect the fund managers from the
political process when the amounts are as large as half of GDP and growing to more than100
percent of GDP. If the future of Social Security is to include an investment-based component, it
will almost certainly have to take the form of personal retirement accounts. 
Conclusion
Although the financial outlook for Social Security is correctly regarded as a major fiscal
problem, it is also a great opportunity to make changes that would be desirable even if the
program did not face financial strain from demographic change.
The shift from the pure pay-as-you-go system to a mixed system with a significant role for
investment-based personal retirement accounts can reduce the distortions in the labor market and
increase the present value of expected future consumption. The transition to such a mixed system
can be done gradually in a way that does not require large deficits, a  tax increase, or a decrease in
expected retirement incomes.  Pay-as-you-go benefits would grow more slowly than scheduled in
current law but the expected retirement income of all cohorts would equal or exceed those
scheduled benefits because of the growing size of the expected personal retirement account
annuities. 
If managed properly, the administrative costs would be small. The risk of a mixed system
could be limited by the continued role of the pay-as-you-go benefits, by rules governing personal
retirement accounts investments, and by private market guarantees for individuals willing to give-35-
up some expected yield for greater certainty of future benefits. Finally, a mixed system need not
change the overall distributional character of Social Security but could offer greater benefits to
retiree  groups that remain poor under our current Social Security rules.  
The rapid  aging of the population implies that it will become increasingly difficult to 
start a successful transition in future years.  A failure to act in the next few years may make a large
tax increase inevitable.
January 2005-36-
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